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Abstract 
Today, the use of wearable devices is becoming a thing inherent in the daily activities of urban 
communities. In practice, wearable communications may contain sensitive information regarding a user's 
health record, so authentication and confidentiality of data exchanged must be guaranteed. In addition, the 
success of authentication between users, wearable devices and smartphones is very important because 
there are various threats of attack on the authentication process. Based on previous studies, it was found 
that the security functionality of user impersonation attack is not owned by lightweight authentication 
protocols in the current wearable communication environment. So this research undertakes the design of a 
lightweight authentication protocol to be immune to user impersonation attacks to supplement the lack of 
security functionality in previous protocols with the support of performing a formal analysis using the 
Scyther Tool. The research method used is a Research Library supported by conducting protocol security 
test experiment. The developed protocol utilizes a modified and customized S-NCI key establishment 
protocol scheme to meet all targeted security functionality. The research resulted that the lightweight 
authentication protocol generated was immune to the impersonation attacks of users, then was able to add 
two new functionalities that added wearable devices and added smartphones. 
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1. Introduction 
Wearable technology is an electronic technology or computer that is incorporated into 
items of clothing and accessories which can comfortably be worn on the body. These wearable 
devices can perform many of the same computing tasks as mobile phones and laptop 
computers; however, in some cases, wearable technology can outperform these handheld 
devices entirely. Wearable technology tends to be more sophisticated than handheld technology 
on the market today because it can provide sensory and scanning features not typically seen in 
mobile and laptop devices, such as biofeedback and tracking of physiological function [1].  
The authentication process between WD and MT becomes very important. 
Authentication is very important because there are various threats of attack that can happen [2]. 
Based on [2, 3] comparative results of concise authentication protocol schemes in a wearable 
communication environment consisting of Liu et al [4], Sun et al [5], Liu et al [6], it was 
generated that the security features of mobile terminal stolen attack, wearable device stolen 
attack, replay attack, user/wearable device/mobile terminal impersonation attack and the use of 
non-tamper resistant are not supported by all three protocol schemes. In addition, a number of 
such attacks can be classified into unauthorized access activities where the required security 
requirement is with the key establishment and trust setup [7]. The comparative results of a 
number of lightweight authentication protocol schemes in wearable communication 
environments based on their security features are described in Table 1. Meanwhile, wearable 
device usage trends are illustrated in Figure 1. The problem in this research is how the 
resistance of lightweight authentication protocol in wearable communication environtment is 
designed against mobile terminal stolen attacks, wearable device stolen attacks, replay attacks, 
and wearable device/mobile terminal/user impersonation attacks. 
Following up on these conditions, the proposed solution in this study is designing a 
lightweight authentication protocol on a wearable communication environment that is immune to 
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mobile terminal stolen attacks, wearable device stolen attacks, replay attacks, and wearable 
device/mobile terminal/user impersonation attacks to complement feature deficiencies security 
on previous protocols supported by performing a formal protocol analysis using  
Scyther Tool [10-12]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Forecasted value of the global wearable devices market from 2012 to 2018 [8] 
 
 
Table 1. Analysis of Protocol Security Features [2], [9] 
Feature Liu et al. [4] Sun et al. [5] Liu et al. [6] 
User/Wearable Device/Mobile Terminal Anonymity Preservation V x V 
Mobile Terminal Stolen Attack Protection x x x 
Wearable Device Stolen Attack Protection x x x 
Online/Offline Password Guessing Attack Protection N/A V N/A 
Privileged-Insider Attack Protection V V x 
Traceability Preservation V x V 
Replay Attack Protection x x x 
Man in the Middle Attack Protection V x x 
User/Wearable Device/Mobile Terminal Impersonation Attack 
Protection 
x x x 
Denial-of-Service Attack Protection V V V 
Use of Non-Tamper Resistant Wearable Device x x x 
Password Update Phase V x x 
Dynamic Users Addition Phase V x x 
Replacing Wearable Device Phase V x x 
Replacing Mobile Terminal Phase V x x 
 
 
2. Research Method 
The research method used is a Research Library supported by conducting protocol 
security test experiment. Then, step research flowchart is described in Figure 2. 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
Based on the understanding of previous protocols, the characteristics of the lightweight 
authentication protocol can be explained in Table 2. In addition, the results of weakness 
analysis of previous protocols are Liu et al [4], Sun et al [5], Liu et al [6] and alternative 
development solutions described in Table 3. 
In practice, key establishment protocols can involve trusted third-parties as initial 
system setup and online actions [13-19]. Currently the S-NCI key establishment protocol 
scheme has been developed. After performing formal analysis of S-NCI [20] protocol using 
Scyther Tool, it was found that the security characteristics of Alive and Weakagree are not 
owned by the protocol. So it is necessary to modify the S-NCI protocol by adding IDT (identity T) 
and NT (Nonce from T), and adding a step as a Step 5. Before and after modification of the  
S-NCI protocol is described in Table 4. Efforts to utilize and modify related protocols in various 
fields are also implemented on [21-26].  
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Figure 2. Step research flowchart 
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of Lightweight Authentication Protocols in a Wearable  
Communications Environment 
No. Characteristics 
1. Has a preparatory stage 
2. Has an encryption process to ensure data confidentiality 
3. Has a hash function to ensure the integrity of the data 
4. Has a challenge response process to ensure the authenticity of each entity 
5. Has a mutual authentication process 
6. Has the process of providing session key 
 
 
Table 3. Weakness Analysis of the Protocol and Alternative Protocol Development Steps 
No Weakness Analysis Alternative Development 
1. The user's fingerprint information assets and user 
wearable device passwords whose utilization has not 
been able to prevent the possibility of impersonation 
attacks both WD, MT and Users. 
User fingerprint information and user wearable device 
passwords in protocol steps designed to prevent 
impersonation attacks both WD, MT and Users. 
2. There is user involvement in the role of witnessing 
and determining whether the WD and MT have been 
authenticated, but before that user has not performed 
any special authentication process for the user itself, 
which ensures that that person is indeed a legitimate 
user. So it still allows users to forge. 
User involvement in determining the success of 
authentication between WD and MT should be 
supported by a protocol stage designed to 
accommodate that only authorized users who can 
encounter authentication conditions between the WD 
and the MT. 
3. There are protocol steps that are inconsistent with the 
design principles of cryptographic protocols according 
to Abadi and Needham. 
In designing a lightweight authentication protocol, it is 
best to follow the design principles of cryptographic 
protocols according to Abadi and Needham. 
4. There are a utilization of key exchange protocols that 
are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. 
A lightweight authentication protocol designed, in its 
key exchange step should be immune to replay 
attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
5. Protocol assets that play an important role in 
determining the authenticity of each entity, are still 
stored in the device, allowing enemies to obtain the 
data with a power analysis attack, and can be used 
for further attacks. 
The designed protocol allows all protocol assets that 
play an important role in determining the authenticity 
of each entity not stored in the device. 
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Table 4. Stages of the S-NCI Protocol Before and After Modification 
Before Modification After Modification 
𝐴→𝑇∶𝐸KAT (𝐾s ||𝐼𝐷A ||𝐼𝐷B ||𝑡1 )||𝐻(𝐾s ||𝐼𝐷A 
||𝐼𝐷B ||𝑡1) 
Step 1 
 
𝐴→𝑇∶𝐸KAT (𝐾s ||𝐼𝐷A ||𝐼𝐷B ||IDT||𝑡1 )||𝐻(𝐾s ||𝐼𝐷A ||𝐼𝐷B 
||IDT ||𝑡1 ) 
Step 1 
 
𝑇→𝐵∶𝐸KBT (𝐾s||𝐼𝐷A ||𝑡2 )||𝐻(𝐾s||𝐼𝐷A ||𝑡2 ) Step 2 𝑇→𝐵∶𝐸KBT (𝐾s||𝐼𝐷A ||IDT ||NT ||𝑡2 )||𝐻(𝐾s||𝐼𝐷A ||IDT 
||NT ||𝑡2 ) 
Step 2 
𝐴←𝐵∶𝐸KS (𝑁B||𝑡3) Step 3 𝐴←𝐵∶𝐸Ks (𝑁B ||IDT ||𝑡3) Step 3 
𝐴 → 𝐵 ∶ 𝐻KS (𝑁B) Step 4 𝐴 → 𝐵 ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁B ||IDT) Step 4 
  B → T ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁T) Step 5 
 
 
3.1. Design of Lightweight Authentication Protocol 
The proposed design consists of two stages, namely Registration Phase and Phase 
Pair and Mutual Authentication. In Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication is divided into three 
sub-stages. The proposed design begins with an Initialization System explanation. 
 
3.1.1. Initialization System  
The notation in the designed lightweight authentication protocol described in Table 5. 
Figure 3 describes the result of stage Initialization System. Figure 4 illustrates the proposed 
lightweight authentication protocol authentication model, which consists of four key entities: 
User, Smart Device (smart phone and smart watch), Cloud Server, and a Key Translation 
Center (KTC). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. System initialization on the lightweight 
authentication protocol 
 
 
Figure 4. Lightweight authentication 
protocol authentication model  
 
 
3.1.2. Registration Phase 
At this Registration stage, a user registers by inputting important attributes required by 
the protocol through MT to be stored by the Cloud Server. Registration stages are described in 
Table 6 and Figure 5. Results of registration of the User by using MT, stored in CS, described in 
Table 7, are as follows. 
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Table 5. Notations and Definitions of the Lightweight Authentication Protocol 
Notation Definition Notation Definition 
T Trusted Third party as Key 
Translation Center (KTC) 
PWDWD Password on WD set by the User 
WD Wearable Device F_InfU Fingerprint data on MT set by the User 
MT Mobile Terminal/ Smartphone RandCS The random number belongs to CS 
CS Cloud Server RandT The random number belongs to KTC 
U User KS Session Key 
Atr_P A set of protocol attributes HK MAC hash function (key uses KS) 
EK() The encryption process uses the K 
key 
H Hash function 
KWDT Encryption key between WD and T t Timestamp 
KMTT Encryption key between MT and T N Nonce 
KCST Encryption key between CS and T || Concate 
IDWD WD identity Insert Description of activities to enter data (can be as a 
description of the Initial Registration, Adding Users, 
Adding WD, and Adding MT) 
IDMT MT identity Upd_WD Description of activities to update the WD data 
IDT T identity Upd_MT Description of activities to update the MT data 
IDCS CS identity Upd_pwd_
WD 
Description of activities to update the WD password 
B_AddrWD WD bluetooth address Temp_H_i
nCS 
The temporary variable of the hash result calculated 
by CS 
B_AddrMT MT bluetooth address   
 
 
Table 6. Explanation of the Registration Phase 
Exchange messages on the Registration Phase 
MT→𝑇∶𝐸KMTT(Insert||KS||𝐼𝐷MT||𝐼𝐷CS||𝐼𝐷T||Atr_P||𝑡1)||𝐻(Insert||KS||𝐼𝐷MT||𝐼𝐷CS||𝐼𝐷T||Atr_P||𝑡1)                  Step 1 
𝑇→CS∶EKCST(Insert||KS||𝐼𝐷MT||NT||𝐼𝐷T||Atr_P||𝑡2)||𝐻(Insert||KS||𝐼𝐷MT||NT||𝐼𝐷T||Atr_P||𝑡2)                      
Step 2 
 In this case, for example, CS gets “Insert” 
 However, the description may consist of “Insert”, “Upd_WD”, “Upd_MT” dan “Upd_pwd_WD” 
 Description "Insert" can be used in addition to user registration for the first time, also can be used to Add 
Users, Add WD and Add MT 
 CS gets KS, NT, IDMT, IDT and Atr_P which contains (B_AddrWD||PWDWD|| IDMT||B_AddrMT||F_InfU) 
MT←CS∶ EKs (𝑁CS|| IDT||𝑡3)                                                                                                                       Step 3 
 CS calculates 𝐻Ks (𝑁CS|| IDT)  to be required in Step 4 
 MT gets NCS and IDT, so CS and T have been authenticated by MT 
MT → CS ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁CS|| IDT)                                                                                                                     
Step 4 
CS → T ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁T)                                                                                                                                  
Step 5 
In Step 4, CS compares the previously computed MAC results, with results received from MT. If the result matches, 
then the MT has been authenticated by CS and the protocol is proceeded to Step 5, to authenticate CS by T. After all 
done, CS will process activities “Insert”, “Upd_WD”, “Upd_MT” and “Upd_pwd_WD”. 
 If “Insert” (can be used for Initial Registration/Adding Users/Adding WD/Adding MT) then: 
 CS will add and store all Atr_P data in the tabel_Registrasi_User (Table 7), with the added value of 
H(RandCS||H(PWDWD))  and H(RandCS||H(F_InfU)) into the CsWd and CsMt columns. 
 CS starts calculating and obtaining hash values of H(RandCS||H(PWDWD))  and H(RandCS||H(F_InfU)). 
 Then, CS will do the following query: 
INSERT INTO tabel_Registrasi_User 
VALUES(B_WD=B_AddrWD,P_WD=H(PWDWD),ID_MT=IDMT,B_MT=B_AddrMT,F_USR=H(F_InfU), CsWd= 
H(RandCS||H(PWDWD)), CsMt= H(RandCS||F_InfU)) 
 CS successfully saved into tabel_Registrasi_User. 
 If “Upd_WD” (Replacing Wearable Device) then: 
 CS will update data related to WD (B_AddrWD, PWDWD) of User by F_InfU authentication. 
 Then, CS will do the following query: 
UPDATE tabel_Registrasi_User SET B_WD= B_AddrWD, P_WD= H(PWDWD) WHERE (F_USR = H(F_InfU)) 
 CS successfully saved into tabel_Registrasi_User. 
 If “Upd_MT” (Replacing Mobile Terminal) then: 
 CS will update data related to MT (IDMT, B_AddrMT) of User by F_InfU authentication 
 Then, CS will do the following query: 
UPDATE tabel_Registrasi_User SET ID_MT=IDMT, B_MT=B_AddrMT WHERE (F_USR = H(F_InfU)) 
 CS successfully saved into tabel_Registrasi_User. 
 If “Upd_pwd_WD” (WD Password Update) then: 
 CS will update data related to WD (PWDWD) of User by F_InfU authentication 
 Then, CS will do the following query: 
UPDATE tabel_Registrasi_User SET P_PWD= H(PWDWD) WHERE (F_USR = H(F_InfU)) 
 CS successfully saved into tabel_Registrasi_User. 
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Figure 5. Lightweight authentication protocol registration phase 
 
 
Table 7. Registration Result Stored in Table in CS (table_Registration_User) 
No B_WD P_WD ID_MT B_MT F_USR CsWd CsMt 
1. B_AddrWD h(PWDWD) IDMT B_AddrMT h(F_InfU) h(RandCS||h(PWDWD)) h(RandCS||h(F_InfU)) 
2. - - - - - - - 
3. etc etc etc etc etc etc etc 
 
 
3.1.3. Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication 
Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication consists of three sub-stages, namely Sub  
Stage 1 (WD Authentication by CS), Sub Stage 2 (MT Authentication by CS), and Sub Stage 3 
(Authentication between WD and MT). All sub-stages are described in full in Figure 6, Figure 7, 
Figure 8, and Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Sub stage 1 (WD authentication by CS) Figure 7. Sub stage 2 (MT authentication by CS) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Sub stage 3 (authentication between WD and MT) 
 
 
3.2.    Lightweight Authentication Protocol Security Analysis 
3.2.1. User/Wearable Device/Mobile Terminal Anonymity Preservation 
The availability of user anonymity preservation, wearable devices and smartphones will 
be realized when protection from replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks can materialize. 
Due to the attacker trying to get important data that play a role in the success of device 
authentication/users, from tapping results that can be used to perform replay attacks and  
man-in-the-middle. However, it can not be attackers doing because the lightweight 
authentication protocol designed is proven to be immune to replay attacks and man-in-the-
middle attacks, so the taping results will also not be useful. 
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3.2.2. Mobile Terminal Stolen Attack Protection 
An attacker can steal or get a legitimate User's Smartphone. Then attacker can perform 
a power analysis attack to get the data stored on the smartphone. It will not be useful because 
the data stored on the smartphone are IDT, IDCS, and IDMT where those items do not play an 
important role in determining the success of the authentication process between devices/users. 
So the attacker will not be able to use it for a variety of subsequent attacks. 
 
3.2.3. Wearable Device Stolen Attack Protection 
An attacker can steal or get a legitimate User's wearable device. Then attacker can 
perform a power analysis attack to get the data stored on the device. It will not be useful 
because the data stored on the device are IDT, IDCS, and IDWD where those items do not play 
an important role in determining the success of the authentication process between 
devices/users. So the attacker will not be able to use it for a variety of subsequent attacks. 
 
3.2.4. Online/Offline Password Guessing Attack Protection 
This activity cannot be done by the attacker because when the wearable device or 
smart phone is stolen and carried out attack power analysis, which can be obtained by the 
attacker is an item that is not useful or no effect in the process of authenticating the device or 
the user, so it can not be used as data that can support a password dictionary attack. In 
addition, the protocol has also been shown to be immune to replay and man-in-the-middle 
attacks so the attacker is unable to tap into the communication between the parties. 
 
3.2.5. Privileged-insider Attack Protection 
In this protocol, especially at the registration stage, the registration process involved 
only the legitimate User only. This means there will be no other party who can represent or have 
the same authority as the actual User. Because in the registration stage, there are biometric 
data inquiries, and only eligible or legitimate Users have WD and MT pairs alone that can 
populate the biometric data themselves. In addition, suppose if a legitimate User feels the need 
to be assisted in the registration, then there are other parties who can help, and for example 
theft MT, then it is also useless, because the thief if it can do power analysis, and the data 
obtained nothing useful in the success of the authentication process. 
 
3.2.6. Traceability Preservation 
Traceability of the sender's source of messages is something that can be done on a 
security protocol that is still vulnerable to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. In this concise 
authentication protocol, the tapping results will not work because the attacker does not have its 
encryption key. So the attacker cannot get the actual message and cannotbrowse the message 
source. It also supported earlier analysis that the concise authentication protocol designed was 
immune to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
3.2.7. Replay Attack Protection 
This protocol has been shown to be resistant to replay attacks based on test results 
using a Scyther tool. 
 
3.2.8. Man in the Middle Attack Protection 
This protocol has been shown to be resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks based on 
test results using a Scyther tool. 
 
3.2.9. Wearable Device/Mobile Terminal Impersonation Attack Protection 
An attacker to be able to forge WD or MT must have items that play an important role in 
determining the success of each device/user authentication process. However, even though the 
attacker has stolen WD/MT and performs a power analysis, the attacker still does not get any 
useful items to attack authentication success, so the attacker's attempt to falsify identity against 
the device/user will not work either. In addition, the designed protocol has to scenario that in the 
Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication stage it can only run with the obligation of a legitimate 
User to operate it, as KWDT, KMTT, PWDWD, and F_infu in the protocol are required, and only 
legitimate Users have it. So there is no chance for an attacker to fake WD/MT, because running 
the protocol cannot. In addition, the process of comparing the hash value h(RandCS||h(PWDWD))  
and h(RandCS||h(F_InfU)) occurs within the cloud, where the attacker will not be able to 
encounter that phase let alone manipulate it. 
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Table 8. Explanation of the Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication 
Exchange messages on the Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication 
Sub Stage 1 (WD Authentication by CS) 
WD→𝑇∶𝐸KWDT(KS||H(PWDWD)||B_AddrWD||IDWD||IDCS||𝐼𝐷T||t1)||𝐻(KS||H(PWDWD)|| B_AddrWD||IDWD||IDCS||𝐼𝐷T||t1)                                                                                      
Step 1 
𝑇→CS∶EKCST(KS||H(PWDWD)|| B_AddrWD||NT||IDWD||𝐼𝐷T||t2)||𝐻(KS||H(PWDWD)|| B_AddrWD||NT||IDWD||𝐼𝐷T||t2)                                                                                         
Step 2 
 T calculates the value of 𝐻Ks (𝑁T), to be used in Step 5 
 CS gets KS, hash value of H(PWDWD), B_AddrWD , NT , 𝐼𝐷WD, and IDT. 
 CS will authenticate WD if it is registered on the Registration, and also to obtain a valid MT pair in accordance 
with table_Registration_User, in the following way: 
SELECT ID_MT, B_WD FROM tabel_Registrasi_User  
WHERE B_WD=B_AddrWD AND P_WD=H(PWDWD) AND CsWd=H(RandomCS||H(PWDWD)) 
 If the result does not exist, then the protocol stops and authentication stages on Sub Stage 1 fails. 
 If the result is there, then with sourced from table_Registrasi_User, CS will get valid data that is ID_MT (IDMT) 
and B_WD (B_AddrWD) which is a legitimate WD pair. 
 Then, the protocol proceeds to Step 3. 
WD←CS∶ EKs (𝑁CS||IDT||𝑡3)                                                                                          
Step 3 
 CS calculates 𝐻Ks (𝑁CS|| IDT)  to be required in Step 4. 
 WD gets NCS and IDT, so that CS and T have been authenticated by WD. 
WD→CS ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁CS||IDT)                                                                                            Step 4 
CS→T ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁T)                                                                                                         Step 5 
 In step 4, CS compares the previously computed MAC results, with results received from WD. If the result is 
the same, then the WD has been authenticated by CS and the protocol is proceeded to step 5, to authenticate 
CS by T. After all done, then the protocol can proceed to Sub Stage 2. 
 
Sub Stage 2 (MT Authentication by CS) 
CS→𝑇∶𝐸KCST(KS||B_AddrWD||IDWD||IDCS||IDMT||𝐼𝐷T||t1)||𝐻(KS||B_AddrWD||IDWD||IDCS||IDMT||𝐼𝐷T||t1) Step1 
 IDWD , B_AddrWD and IDMT are obtained from table_Registration_User in CS, which took place on the previous 
Sub Stage 1 
𝑇→MT∶EKMTT(KS||B_AddrWD||IDWD||NT||IDCS||𝐼𝐷T||t2)|| 𝐻(KS||B_AddrWD||IDWD||NT||IDCS||𝐼𝐷T||t2)      Step2 
 T calculates the value of 𝐻Ks (𝑁T), to be used in Step 5. 
 MT gets KS , B_AddrWD, IDWD, NT, IDCS, and IDT. 
CS←MT∶ EKs (𝑁MT||H(F_InfU)||IDT||𝑡3)                                                                                               Step3 
 MT calculates 𝐻Ks(𝑁MT||H(F_InfU)||IDT) to be required in Step 4 
 CS gets NMT, hash value H(F_InfU) and IDT. 
 Next, CS will authenticate the MT if it is listed in table_Registration_User, by doing the following: 
SELECT CsMt FROM tabel_Registrasi_User WHERE F_USR= H(F_InfU) AND CsMt=H(RandCS||H(F_InfU)) 
 If the result does not exist, then the protocol stops and authentication on Sub Stage 2 fails. Then, MT will 
display on screen "Refuse". 
 If the result is there, then MT and T have been authenticated by CS and protocol can proceed to Step 4. 
CS → MT ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁MT||H(F_InfU)||IDT)                                                                                                Step4 
MT → T ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁T)                                                                                                                            Step5 
 In Step 4, MT compares the previously computed MAC results, with results received from CS. If the result is the 
same, then CS has been authenticated by MT. Then, MT will display on the "Accept" screen. Then, the protocol 
proceeds to Step 5, to authenticate MT by T. After all done, then the protocol can proceed to Sub Stage 3.                                                                                                                   
 
Sub Stage 3 (Authentication between WD and MT) 
MT→𝑇∶𝐸KMTT(KS||B_AddrWD||IDMT||IDWD||IDT||t1)|| 𝐻(KS||B_AddrWD||IDMT||IDWD||IDT||t1)                  Step 1 
 IDWD and B_AddrWD were previously obtained from CS, which took place on the previous Sub Stage 2. 
𝑇→WD∶EKWDT(KS||B_AddrWD||NT||IDMT||IDT||t2)|| 𝐻(KS||B_AddrWD||NT||IDMT||IDT||t2)                        Step 2 
 T calculates the value of 𝐻Ks (𝑁T), to be used in Step 5. 
 WD gets KS,  B_AddrWD , NT , IDMT and IDT 
 To authenticate that MT is the right smartphone pair of WD, then WD will compare the Bluetooth address on 
WD with the B_AddrWD earned. 
 If the value of B_AddrWD compared of the WD Bluetooth address is not the same, then the protocol stops and 
Sub Stage 3 fails. Then, WD will display on screen "Refuse". 
 If the value of B_AddrWD compared of the WD Bluetooth address is the same, then the protocol can proceed to 
Step 3. 
MT←WD∶ EKs (𝑁WD||IDT||𝑡3)                                                                                                             Step 3 
 WD calculates 𝐻Ks(𝑁WD||IDT) to be required in Step 4. 
 MT can get NWD and IDT, so that WD and T have been authenticated by MT. 
MT → WD ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁WD||IDT)                                                                                                              Step 4 
WD → T ∶ 𝐻Ks (𝑁T)                                                                                                                          Step 5 
 In step 4, WD compares the previously computed MAC results, with results received from MT. If the result is 
the same, then the MT has been authenticated by WD. Then, WD will display on the "Accept" screen. Then, the 
protocol proceeds to Step 5, to authenticate WD by T. 
 Once all is done, the Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication successful, then WD and MT have KS used in 
secret communications. 
 The user immediately executes local authentication by checking the screen results on WD and MT. If all screen 
displays Accept results, then User immediately makes a pairing Bluetooth between WD and MT. 
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3.2.10. User Impersonation Attack Protection 
The lightweight authentication protocol designed has already demonstrated that the 
Phase Pair and Mutual Authentication stage can only work with legitimate Users operating it, as 
KWDT or KMTT, PWDWD, and F_infu inputs are required in the protocol, as a requirement for the 
protocol to function. Then it is only the legitimate User who owns it. So with the existence of 
such specification, forgery of User cannot be done. 
 
3.2.11. Denial-of-Service Attack Protection 
A DoS attack can be done with the condition that an attacker can insert certain steps 
into the protocol to prevent the protocol from failing or unable to provide service. However, 
these conditions cannot be attackers do, because the attacker can only insert if the protocol has 
man-in-the-middle weakness, but it has been proven that this lightweight authentication protocol 
is immune to replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. So the attacker can not do the DoS attacks. 
 
3.2.12. Use of Non-Tamper Resistant Wearable Device 
Not discussed in this study. 
 
3.2.13. Support of Password Update Phase 
The activity description of "Upd_pwd_WD" allows this protocol to have the feature of 
Password WD Update, which occurs at the registration stage. 
 
3.2.14. Support of Dynamic Users Addition Phase 
The activity description of "Insert" allows this protocol to have the feature of adding 
User, which occurs at the registration stage. 
 
3.2.15. Support of Replacing Wearable Device Phase 
The activity description of "Upd_WD" allows this protocol to have the feature of 
Replacing WD, which occurs at the registration stage. 
 
3.2.16. Support of Replacing Mobile Terminal Phase 
The activity description of "Upd_MT" allows this protocol to have the feature of 
Replacing MT, which occurs at the registration stage. 
 
3.2.17. Support Adding Wearable Device 
The activity description of "Insert" allows this protocol to have the feature of adding WD, 
which occurs at the registration stage. 
 
3.2.18. Support Adding Mobile Terminal 
The activity description of "Insert" allows this protocol to have the feature of adding MT, 
which occurs at the registration stage. Thus, based on the designs performed and the resulting 
security analysis, the proposed lightweight authentication protocol has the functionality 
described in Table 9, as follows: 
 
 
Table 9. Results of Protocol Security Functionality 
Feature Liu et al. 
[4] 
Sun et al. 
[5] 
Liu et al. 
[6] 
The Proposed 
Protocol 
User/WD/MT Anonymity Preservation V x V V 
Mobile Terminal Stolen Attack Protection x x x V 
Wearable Device Stolen Attack Protection x x x V 
Online/Offline Password Guessing Attack Protection N/A V N/A V 
Privileged-Insider Attack Protection V V x V 
Traceability Preservation V x V V 
Replay Attack Protection x x x V 
Man in the Middle Attack Protection V x x V 
User/WD/MT Impersonation Attack Protection x x x V 
Denial-of-Service Attack Protection V V V V 
Use of Non-Tamper Resistant Wearable Device x x x x 
Password Update Phase V x x V 
Dynamic Users Addition Phase V x x V 
Replacing Wearable Device Phase V x x V 
Replacing Mobile Terminal Phase V x x V 
Adding Wearable Device  x x x V 
Adding Smartphone x x x V 
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3.3. Formal Analysis 
 Formal analysis is performed with a Scyther Tool, which results in all stages of the 
protocol being shown to be immune to Replay Attacks and Man-in-The-Middle Attacks and 
meeting the criteria Alive, Weakagree, Niagree, and Nisynch. The results of the formal analysis 
using Scyther Tools on Registration Phase, Sub Stage 1 (WD Authentication by CS), Sub  
Stage 2 (MT Authentication by CS) and Sub Stage 3 (Authentication between WD and MT) are 
explained sequentially in Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Scyther result: verify (registration phase) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Scyther result: verify (WD authentication by CS) 
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Figure 11. Scyther result: 
verify (MT authentication by CS) 
Figure 12. Scyther result: 
verify (authentication between WD and MT) 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study has the following conclusions: a) The lightweight authentication protocols in 
the wearable communication environment generated in this study are immune to mobile 
terminal stolen attack, wearable device stolen attack, replay attack, user/wearable 
device/mobile terminal impersonation attack to supplement the lack of security functionality in 
previous lightweight authentication protocols; b) The lightweight authentication protocols in the 
wearable communication environment generated in this study have been shown to be safe 
against replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks and meet all formal analysis criteria in the 
Scyther Tool; c) The lightweight authentication protocol in the wearable communication 
environment generated in this study has two new functionalities that add wearable device and 
add smartphone. 
 
 
References 
[1] Tehrani K, Michael A. Wearable Technology and Wearable Devices: Everything You Need to Know. 
2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.wearabledevices.com/what-is-a-wearable-device/. [Accessed: 
December 1, 2017]. 
[2] Das AK, Zeadally S, Wazid M. Lightweight authentication protocols for wearable devices. Computers 
& Electrical Engineering. 2017; 63: 196–208. 
[3] Gope P, Lee J, Quek TQS. Resilience of DoS Attacks in Designing Anonymous User Authentication 
Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. IEEE Sensors J. 2017; 17(2): 498–503. 
[4] Liu S, Hu S, Weng J, Zhu S, Chen Z. A novel asymmetric three-party based authentication scheme in 
wearable devices environment. Journal of Network and Computer Applications. 2016; 60: 144–154. 
[5] Sun DZ, Huai JP, Sun JZ, Zhang JW, Feng ZY. A new design of wearable token system for mobile 
device security. IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. 2008; 54(4): 1784–1789. 
[6] Liu W, Liu H, Wan Y, Kong H, Ning H. The yoking-proof-based authentication protocol for cloud-
assisted wearable devices. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing. 2016; 20(3): 469–479. 
[7] Al-Janabi S, Al-Shourbaji I, Shojafar M, Shamshirband S. Survey of main challenges (security and 
privacy) in wireless body area networks for healthcare applications. Egyptian Informatics Journal. 
2017; 18(2): 113–122. 
                    ISSN: 1693-6930 
TELKOMNIKA  Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2019:  561-572 
572 
[8] U.S. Global wearable technology market 2012-2018|Statistic Forecasted value of the global wearable 
devices market from 2012 to 2018 (in billion Statista Accounts : Access All Statistics . Starting from 
$588/Year Global wearable technology market 2012). 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/302482/wearable-device-market-value/%0A. [Accessed: 12-May-
2018]. 
[9] Adrian D, Bhargavan K, Durumeric Z, Gaudry P, Green M, Halderman J A, Heninger N, Springall D, 
Thomé E, Valenta L, Vandersloot B, Wustrow E, Paul S Z. Imperfect Forward Secrecy : How  
Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice. Proceedings of the 22
nd
 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security. 2015: 5–17. 
[10] Cremers CJF. Scyther : Unbounded Verification of Security Protocols. Technical report/Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology Zurich, Department of Computer Science. 2011; 572: 1–18. 
[11] Pavel O. Analysis of authentication protocols with scyter: Case study. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 
(including Subser. Lect. Notes Artif. Intell. Lect. Notes Bioinformatics). 2011: 359–365. 
[12] Dalal N, Shah J, Hisaria K, Jinwala D. A Comparative Analysis of Tools for Verification of Security 
Protocols. International Journal of Communications, Network and System Sciences. 2010; 3(10): 
779–787. 
[13] AJ Menezes, PC Van Oorschot, and SA Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography. 1997. 106. 
[14] B Colin and M Anish. Information Security and Cryptography Texts and Monographs Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg GmbH. 2003. 
[15] RM Needham and MD Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of 
computers. Commun ACM. 1978; 21(12): 993–999. 
[16] Z Cheng and R Comley. Attacks on an ISO/IEC 11770-2 key establishment protocol. Int. J. Netw. 
Secur. 2006; 3(3): 290–295. 
[17] DE Denning and GM Sacco. Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Commun ACM. 1981; 24(8):  
533–536. 
[18] SG Stubblebine and VD Gligor. On message integrity in cryptographic protocols. Proc. 1992 IEEE 
Comput. Soc. Symp. Res. Secur. Priv. 1992: 85–104. 
[19] W Mao and C Boyd. On The Use of Encryption in Cryptographic Protocols. Proc. 4
th
 IMA Conf. 
Cryptogr. Coding. 1995. 
[20] Sadikin MALI, Windarta S. S-NCI: Protocol Design of Key Establishment (in Indonesian: S-NCI: 
Desain Protokol Key Establishment). Proc. Semin. Nas. Mat. Univ. Indonesia. 2017: 1–10. 
[21] Budiyanto S, Asvial M, Gunawan D. Performance Analysis of Genetic Zone Routing Protocol 
Combined With Vertical Handover Algorithm for 3G-WiFi Offload. Journal of ICT Research and 
Applications. 2014; 8(1): 49–63. 
[22] Asvial M, Budiyanto S, Gunawan D. An intelligent load balancing and offloading in 3G-WiFi offload 
network using hybrid and distance vector algorithm. IEEE Symposium, Wireless Technology and 
Applications (ISWTA). 2014: 36–40. 
[23] Budiyanto S, Nugroho A. A New Model of Genetic Zone Routing Protocol (GZRP): The Process of 
Load Balancing and Offloading on The UMTS-IEEE 802.11g Hybrid Networks. TELKOMNIKA 
Telecommunication, Computing, Electronics and Control. 2017; 15(2): 598–605. 
[24] Adiputra RR, Hadiyoso S, Hariyani YS. Internet of Things : Low Cost and Wearable SpO2 Device for 
Health Monitoring. International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE). 2018; 8(2): 
939–945. 
[25] Weng OT, Isaak S, Yusof Y. Low Power CMOS Electrocardiogram Amplifier Design for Wearable 
Cardiac Screening. International Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (IJECE). 2018; 8(3): 
1830–1836. 
[26] Karthik RAN, Parvathy AK. Physicians’ and Users’ Perceptions Towards Wearable Health Devices. 
Indonesian journal of electrical engineering and computer science. 2017; 5(1): 48–57. 
 
 
